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R&D EXPENDITURE AND EARNINGS TARGETS 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines whether firms cut R&D spending in response to short-term earnings 
pressures and how equity markets interpret such behaviour. Failure to report positive earnings 
and earnings growth increases the probability of a subsequent cut in R&D spending, while 
pressure to report positive earnings and earnings growth in the current period leads to 
contemporaneous cuts in R&D investment. On average, investors place less weight on 
earnings increases accompanied by unexpected cuts in R&D spending. However, the 
magnitude of the valuation discount varies according to the perceived reason for the cut and 
the importance of R&D investment as a driver of firm value.  
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R&D EXPENDITURE AND EARNINGS TARGETS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Accounting standards generally require expenditure on uncertain investment activities 
such as research and development (R&D) to be expensed as incurred, leading to tension 
between short-term earnings performance and long-term value creation. On the one hand, 
relentless advances in technology and globalisation mean that competitive advantage and 
corporate success are increasingly reliant on firms’ internal resources and capabilities 
(Wernerfelt 1984, Barney 1995, Lev and Sougiannis 1996, Chan Lakonishok and Sougiannis 
2001). Yet paradoxically, the weight attached to meeting and beating short-term earnings 
targets appears to be increasing (Dechow and Skinner 2000: 242). How managers and 
investors respond to these competing forces is an issue that has exercised policymakers and 
academics for many years. Against this backdrop, we assess whether UK managers adjust 
R&D spending in response to short-term earnings pressures and how the capital market 
evaluates such behaviour.  
 Prior US research documents evidence of apparently myopic investment behaviour 
with managers pruning R&D expenditure to boost current-period earnings performance 
(Baber, Fairfield and Haggard 1991, Perry and Grinaker 1994, Bange and De Bondt 1998, 
Bushee 1998, Cheng 2004). While little comparable large sample empirical evidence exists in 
the UK, policymakers have repeatedly expressed concern about the low levels of R&D 
investment undertaken by UK firms relative to their international counterparts, and the 
possibility that capital market pressures encourage excessive emphasis on short-term earnings 
performance (Department of Trade and Industry 2003, HM Treasury 2004 and 2005).i 
Using a large sample of R&D-active UK firms between December 1989 and 
December 2002, our first set of tests examine whether R&D spending is sensitive to achieving 
current and lagged earnings targets. Controlling for underlying firm performance, we find that 
failure to report positive earnings levels and changes increases the probability of R&D 
expenditure being cut in the next accounting year. We also find that pressure to report 
 2 
positive earnings levels and changes leads to contemporaneous cuts in R&D expenditure as 
management shave expenses in an attempt to reach the target. Further analysis reveals this 
association is less pronounced for high R&D intensity firms, suggesting a lower propensity to 
cut R&D in the face of short-term earnings pressure when such investment represents an 
important source of competitive advantage.  
 While strategists, researchers and policymakers have largely focused on the costs of 
cutting R&D to boost reported earnings (Stein 1988 and 1989, Rappaport 2005), recent 
evidence from the accounting literature documents significant market-based rewards when 
firms report earnings numbers in excess of certain predefined thresholds (Bernard, Thomas 
and Abarbanell 1993, Barth, Elliot and Finn 1999, Bartov, Givoly and Hyan 2002, Kasznik 
and McNichols 2002, Skinner and Sloan 2002). In our second set of tests, we examine how 
market participants interpret favourable earnings performance achieved at the expense of 
unexpected cuts in R&D spending. We find that the response coefficient associated with 
earnings increases is substantially lower for firms that cut R&D compared to those that 
maintain or increase R&D spending. Partitioning the sample by R&D intensity, we find that 
cuts in R&D are viewed most negatively for high R&D intensive firms. These findings 
support the view that the net benefit of manipulating R&D investment to beat earnings 
benchmarks is lower for firms where current R&D investments represent an important driver 
of future value. Finally, we test whether the market discriminates between cuts in R&D 
spending driven by benchmark beating considerations and cuts motivated by other factors. 
Full sample tests reveal some (weak) evidence that the market applies a lower multiple to 
earnings increases accompanied by R&D cuts when the reduction is likely to have been 
motivated by benchmark beating considerations. Further analysis reveals this result is 
confined to moderate R&D intensity firms. For low R&D intensity firms, unexpected R&D 
spending cuts in the presence of earnings growth go unpunished regardless of whether or not 
target-driven manipulation is a factor. Conversely, investors penalise all cuts in R&D 
spending made by high R&D intensity firms with equal severity in the presence of earnings 
growth. The contrasting patterns observed for high and low R&D intensive firms are 
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consistent with differences in the perceived importance of R&D investment for long-term 
value creation across the two groups. 
 Our paper contributes to the extant literatures on R&D manipulation and benchmark 
beating on several levels. First, we provide evidence that speaks to the ongoing debate in the 
UK over whether management make discretionary R&D investment decisions with an eye to 
reported earnings performance. Our results suggest that R&D spending is indeed sensitive to 
short-term earnings targets. Findings concerning the contemporaneous link between R&D 
spending and earnings targets confirm prior US research, while evidence that missing an 
earnings benchmark leads to subsequent cuts in R&D expenditure is new to the literature. 
Second, our analysis is the first to our knowledge that attempts to reconcile the R&D 
manipulation and benchmark beating literatures by examining how investors interpret 
favourable earnings performance in the presence of unexpected cuts in R&D spending. 
Results reveal that investors appear to trade-off the costs of R&D cuts against the benefits of 
earnings growth in a relatively sophisticated manner. In particular, we show that the market’s 
response to unexpected cuts in R&D spending depends on both the presumed reason for the 
cut and the perceived importance of R&D investment as a driver of firm value.  
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section develops our 
primary research questions. Section 3 presents details of our sample and data. Section 4 
reports results of tests linking the probability of a cut in R&D spending to contemporaneous 
and lagged earnings performance. Section 5 presents results of market-based tests exploring 
the trade-off between the rewards to benchmark beating and the penalties to R&D cutbacks. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
R&D expenditure and earnings targets 
 An increasing body of evidence supports the view that corporate management face 
significant pressure to avoid reporting losses, earnings declines and negative earnings 
surprises (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser 1999, Skinner and 
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Sloan 2002, Gore, Pope and Singh 2007). Precisely why management place such weight on 
achieving simple earnings thresholds is not entirely clear, although one possibility is 
stakeholders’ reliance on heuristic cutoffs such as zero changes and levels of earnings to 
assess managerial and firm performance (Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). Given their potential 
importance, it is not surprising that management occasionally resort to manipulating earnings 
upwards to meet or beat these key benchmarks. Research indicates that management employ a 
range of manipulation techniques to achieve earnings targets, including aggressive cash flow 
recognition (Burgstalher and Dichev 1997), discretionary accruals (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn 
2002, Gore, Pope and Singh 2007), reclassification of core expenses as special items (McVay 
2006), and share repurchases (Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong 2003, Hribar, Jenkins and 
Johnson 2004). 
Although potentially more costly, management also have the option of manipulating 
earnings through real operating and investing decisions. A number of studies provide 
compelling evidence that US managers shave discretionary R&D investments to boost 
current-period reported earnings (Baber, Fairfield and Haggard 1991, Perry and Grinaker 
1994, Bange and DeBondt 1998, Bushee 1998). These findings are confirmed by survey 
evidence reported by Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) for a sample of 401 financial 
executives, 80% of whom indicated that they would consider reducing R&D spending to meet 
an earnings target. Similar conclusions regarding managers’ attitude toward R&D expenditure 
and earnings targets have also been reported for the UK (Demirag 1995, Grinyer, Russell and 
Collison 1998). The UK evidence is particularly pertinent given concern over the lack of 
long-term investment by UK firms relative to their international counterparts. To date, 
however, no large sample empirical evidence concerning the link between R&D expenditure 
and short-term earnings targets exists for the UK. The first research question examined in this 
paper, therefore, is whether UK managers prune R&D spending when there is a risk of 
unmanaged earnings falling short of target.  
 While the contemporaneous link between R&D spending and earnings benchmarks 
has been previously examined in a non-UK setting, the consequence of missing an earnings 
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target for R&D spending in subsequent years remains an unexplored issue in the empirical 
literature. Prior research, however, suggests that such a link may exist. For example, Barth et 
al. (1999) demonstrate that although the valuation premium for firms reporting a string of 
earnings increases diminishes when the pattern is broken, a portion of the premium is 
preserved for firms that immediately return to an earnings growth trajectory. An implication 
of this result is that management are likely to be very sensitive to reported performance in the 
year following an earnings disappointment and that this sensitivity may lead to temporary cuts 
in discretionary investment spending aimed at ensuring an immediate earnings turnaround. 
Consistent with this view, of the 226 UK directors surveyed by Demirag (1998), 41% 
identified lagged earnings performance as a key determinant of the resources available for 
current-period R&D projects; only 10% of directors considered R&D spending to be 
insensitive to lagged earnings performance. Accordingly, the second research question 
explored in this paper is whether missing an earnings target leads management to cut R&D 
spending in the following year.  
 
Market-based rewards and penalties  
Precisely how market participants interpret favourable earnings performance 
achieved at the expense of unexpected cuts in R&D spending is unclear a priori. On the one 
hand, evidence on the capital market returns to benchmarking beating reveals significant 
valuation rewards to target attainment (Barth et al. 1999, Bartov et al. 2002, Kasznik and 
McNichols 2002), and disproportionately large valuation penalties when earnings targets are 
missed (Bernard et al. 1993, Skinner and Sloan 2002). Conversely, prior research reveals a 
positive association between unexpected changes in R&D expenditure and shareholder wealth 
(Chan, Martin and Kensinger 1990). These findings imply market participants generally view 
R&D investment as helping to create and maintain firms’ competitive advantage, and that 
shaving R&D spending purely to achieve an earnings benchmark is likely to be value-
destroying. Further, research also indicates that the valuation premium associated with 
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meeting or beating an earnings target is lower for firms suspected by the market of having 
managed earnings (Bartov et al. 2002, Hribar et al. 2004).  
To date, the R&D management and benchmark-beating reward literatures have 
largely evolved in isolation. Accordingly, the third research question on which this paper 
seeks evidence is how investors trade-off the valuation rewards to benchmark beating against 
the valuation penalties of unexpected cuts in R&D spending, and whether the market 
discriminates between target-driven cuts in R&D expenditure versus reductions in R&D 
spending driven by real economic considerations. 
 
3. SAMPLE AND DATA 
Our sampling frame comprises the population of Datastream UK non-financial firms 
that reported positive R&D expenditure at least once between December 1989 and December 
2002. Before the switch to International Financial Reporting Standards, accounting for R&D 
in the UK was governed by Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No.13 Revised (SSAP 
13 Revised). Our sampling period excludes pre-December 1989 year-ends because SSAP 13 
Revised only applied to financial years beginning on or after 1 January 1989. Empirical tests 
require three consecutive years of R&D data. We therefore retain only those firm-years where 
contemporaneous, one- and two-period lagged values are non-missing. We also require data 
for our control variables (see below) to be available. Fiscal years longer than thirteen months 
and shorter than eleven months are excluded to ensure time-series comparability of 
accounting data, and we minimise the impact of extreme observations by trimming the top 
and bottom one percentiles of the sample according to (scaled) R&D expenditure and reported 
earnings. The resulting sample comprises 3,866 firm-year observations. Although twenty-one 
Datastream level-4 industries are represented in the final sample, a high degree of clustering 
is apparent with just five industries (software & computer services, engineering & machinery, 
electronic electrical equipment, support services, and pharmaceuticals) accounting for 51% of 
the sample.  
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SSAP 13 Revised allowed UK managers the option of either expensing all R&D as 
incurred or capitalising development expenditure when certain feasibility conditions were 
satisfied. Consistent with patterns documented by Oswald and Zarowin (2007a), R&D was 
expensed in the majority (88%) of sample cases, with management electing to capitalise all or 
part of their development expenditure in the remaining 456 firm-years. While it is 
straightforward to determine the change in R&D expenditure for firms that expensed R&D as 
incurred, this is not the case for firms that capitalised development spending because 
Datastream only reports the net change in the R&D asset (i.e., after deducting amortisation).ii 
We therefore simplify the subsequent analysis by focusing exclusively on firms that expensed 
all R&D. The cost of this simplification is sample selection bias, which could affect the 
validity of our conclusions if executives use their discretion over the accounting treatment of 
development expenditure to manage earnings (Oswald and Zarowin 2007b).iii We therefore 
employ Heckman (1976, 1979) sample selection methods in our multivariate tests to correct 
for any bias introduced by our sampling method. (Further details provided below.) Table 1 
summarises the sample selection procedure. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the subsample of 3,410 R&D expensers that 
form the basis of our tests. Year-on-year increases in R&D expenditure are more common 
than decreases during our sample period. The average (median) market-to-book ratio is well 
in excess of one, as expected for a sample of R&D-active firms with significant growth 
options. Positive mean (median) values for changes in sales, capital expenditure, and earnings 
before R&D provide further evidence that our sample loads on growth firms. 
 
4. EARNINGS TARGETS AND R&D EXPENDITURE 
Method 
The focus of our analysis is on R&D spending cuts made in response to short-term 
earnings targets, which we label ‘unexpected’ reductions in R&D activity. We treat such 
changes as distinct from those driven by business fundamentals such as shifts in corporate 
strategy, changes in funding constraints, and variation in the set of positive NPV 
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opportunities, which we classify as part of ‘normal’ or ‘expected’ variation in R&D activity. 
Empirical tests therefore rely on our ability to reliably partition total R&D spending into 
expected and unexpected components. Results reported in the body of this paper rely on a 
simple random walk model of expected R&D expenditure, with negative (positive) first 
differences interpreted as unexpected decreases (increases) in R&D spending (Bushee 1998). 
We focus on results from this naïve expectations model for reasons of parsimony. Repeating 
all tests using Berger’s (1993) more sophisticated regression-based expectations model that 
explicitly controls for the fundamental determinants of R&D spending yields results that are 
entirely consistent with those reported below. 
We employ two measures of target earnings in our empirical tests: positive earnings 
and positive earnings growth.iv We examine the lagged association between targets and R&D 
spending using two indicator variables. The first variable (EARNt-1 ≤ 0) takes the value of one 
if last period’s earnings were less than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise; the second 
variable (∆EARNt-1 ≤ 0) takes the value of one if last period’s earnings change was less than 
or equal to zero, and zero otherwise.v If failure to beat last period’s earnings benchmark has a 
detrimental impact on current-period R&D spending then the incidence of unexpected 
cutbacks in R&D investment should be positively related to EARNt-1 ≤ 0 and ∆EARNt-1 ≤ 0. 
The contemporaneous association between target earnings performance and R&D is 
examined using the procedure employed by Baber et al. (1991), Perry and Grinaker (1994), 
Bushee (1998), Cheng (2004) and Oswald and Zarowin (2007b). We begin by constructing a 
measure of premanaged earnings by adding R&D expenditure back to reported earnings. Then 
we partition the sample according to the level of premanaged earnings relative to target. Firm-
years where premanaged earnings exceed target are allocated to the ABOVE partition. Firm-
years where premanaged earnings undershoot target by an amount that could be reversed by 
pruning R&D expenditure are allocated to the WITHIN partition. Finally, observations where 
premanaged earnings are so low that the target remains beyond reach even if R&D spending 
were reduced to zero are allocated to the BELOW partition. If managers use their discretion 
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over R&D expenditure to achieve current-period earnings benchmarks, the frequency of 
unexpected R&D cuts should be higher in WITHIN relative to ABOVE. The behaviour of 
firms in BELOW is more ambiguous. On the one hand, if managers prefer to minimise the 
earnings shortfall then they may behave as predicted in WITHIN, sacrificing current-period 
R&D in an effort to move earnings closer to target. On the other hand, if managers take the 
view that “a miss is as good as a mile”, then the incentive to shave R&D spending diminishes 
and hence the frequency of unexpected R&D cuts may be more similar to that observed in 
ABOVE. Precisely how managers in BELOW exercise their discretion over R&D expenditure 
is therefore an empirical issue. 
 
Univariate results 
Preliminary insights concerning the association between earnings targets and R&D 
expenditure are presented in table 3. Panel A reports evidence on the link between current-
period abnormal R&D expenditure and lagged target attainment. The fraction of cases with a 
negative change in R&D expenditure is clearly higher when last year’s earnings fall short of 
target than when last period’s earnings benchmark is achieved. Current-period R&D 
expenditure falls in 46% (42%) of cases where EARNt-1 (∆EARNt-1) ≤ 0 compared with only 
33% (32%) of cases when EARNt-1 (∆EARNt-1) > 0. A chi-square test rejects the null 
hypothesis that current-period R&D expenditure and lagged target attainment are independent 
at the 1% level. Panel B reports evidence on the contemporaneous association between 
abnormal R&D expenditure and the proximity of premanaged earnings to the target. 
Independence is again rejected at the 1% level. Reductions in R&D spending appear to occur 
more frequently when premanaged earnings undershoot the benchmark than when they 
exceed it. Overall, these univariate findings support the view that R&D expenditure is 




Univariate tests reported in table 3 fail to control for factors correlated with earnings 
performance that may also affect R&D spending. In particular, if the failure to meet or beat an 
earnings threshold is simply a manifestation of more pervasive performance problems, then 
these results could be capturing expected variation in R&D spending resulting from changes 
in business fundamentals, rather than unexpected R&D cuts motivated by short-term target-
beating behaviour. The analysis also fails to demonstrate whether contemporaneous and 
lagged target considerations are associated with incrementally significant effects on R&D 
spending or whether they merely capture the same underlying phenomenon (i.e., poor 
performance). Finally, the analysis takes no account of selection bias resulting from our 
decision to exclude R&D capitalisers. We therefore estimate the following multivariate 
logistic regression relating the probability of an unexpected cut in R&D spending to current 



































where pit is the latent probability that firm i unexpectedly cuts R&D spending in year t (yit = 
1) and 1 – pit is the latent probability that firm i maintains or increases R&D expenditure in 
year t (yit = 0); EARNit-1 ≤ 0 is an indicator variable equal to one if lagged reported earnings 
for firm i were less than or equal to zero, and zero otherwise; ∆EARNit-1 ≤ 0 is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the lagged reported earnings change was less than or equal to zero, 
and zero otherwise; WITHINit is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years in the 
WITHIN portfolio and zero otherwise; BELOWit is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-
years in the BELOW portfolio and zero otherwise;  Control_R&Dit is a vector of k variables 
controlling for expected changes in periodic R&D expenditure; and Control_OTHit is a vector 
of j controls for the propensity or opportunity for management to adjust R&D spending in 
response to short-term earnings pressures. 
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Following Berger (1993), Bange and DeBondt (1998) and Bushee (1998), 
Controls_R&D includes firm-level changes in sales (∆SALESit), capital expenditure 
(∆CAPXit), funds available for investment (∆FUNDSit), and lagged changes in R&D 
expenditure (∆RDit-1). The ∆SALES variable proxies for growth: growth firms are considered 
less likely to cut R&D. Negative ∆CAPX may signal a decline in investment opportunities 
associated with transition to a more mature stage of the investment cycle: firms entering a 
more mature stage of their investment lifecycle are also expected to trim spending on R&D. 
The ∆FUNDS variable captures internal funding constraints: an increase (decrease) in funds 
available for investment is expected to reduce (increase) the probability of a cut in R&D 
expenditure. In addition to these firm-level drivers of R&D spending, we also include the 
median change in R&D expenditure for firm i’s industry (computed after excluding firm i) 
(∆INDRDit) to control for industry-wide shifts in R&D spending during period t.  
The Controls_OTH vector includes measures of firm size (SIZEit), leverage (LEVit), 
the market-to-book ratio (MKTBit), R&D intensity (RDIit), and the magnitude of operating 
accruals (|ACCit|). All else equal, larger firms face richer information environments that serve 
to constrain the opportunity for earnings management (Wiedman 1996). In addition, SIZE 
may also be negatively associated with the probability that a firm is cash constrained (Opler et 
al. 1999) and therefore facing incentives to cut R&D. Leverage captures potential debt 
covenant incentives to manipulate earnings (Duke and Hunt 1990). The probability of cutting 
R&D expenditure to avoid costly debt contract violation is expected to be increasing in LEV. 
The market-to-book ratio proxies for Tobin’s Q: Bushee (1989) argues that high Q firms face 
more valuable R&D growth opportunities and therefore face a higher cost of cutting R&D in 
response to short-term earnings pressures. The RDI variable captures the expectation that 
R&D-intensive firms face greater market scrutiny of their R&D expenditure decisions (Barth 
et al. 2001), thereby reducing the opportunity to adjust R&D spending programmes to achieve 
short-term earnings targets. Accounting accruals represent an alternative to real earnings 
management. All else equal, naturally high |ACC| provide managers with greater scope for 
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accrual-based manipulation, thereby reducing the need to engage in real earnings 
management. Finally, since our sample selection procedure excludes firms where 
management chose to capitalise R&D spending, Controls_OTH also includes a correction for 
sample selection bias (BIASit). The BIAS variable is the inverse Mills ratio retrieved from a 
first-stage probit regression modelling the decision to expense versus capitalise periodic R&D 
expenditure (Heckman 1976, 1979).vi 
Table 4 reports coefficient estimates and model summary statistics for equation (1). 
The probability of an unexpected cut in period t R&D spending is generally less evident for 
growth firms, R&D intensive firms, and large firms. Cuts in R&D spending partially reverse 
prior-year increases. The estimated coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant in 
most specifications, signifying that sample selection bias resulting from omission of R&D 
capitalisers does not appear to be a serious problem in our analysis. 
Models 1 and 2 focus on the lagged association between the likelihood of an R&D cut 
and benchmark beating. Consistent with our univariate findings, model 1 reveals that a 
reduction in current-period R&D expenditure is more likely when lagged earnings fall below 
target. Both lagged target indicator variables are incrementally significant at the 5% level, 
suggesting that positive earnings levels and changes represent distinct benchmarks.  
Model 2 extends the basic regression to test whether the relation between R&D 
expenditure and lagged earnings performance differs with the level of R&D intensity. If R&D 
intensive firms suffer less short-term earnings pressure due to longer performance horizons, 
we would expect to observe a weaker association between lagged earnings performance and 
the probability of shaving R&D investment as R&D intensity increases. R&D intensity is 
measured as the R&D expense scaled by lagged sales. Model 2, however, reveals no such 
association. 
The final six columns in table 4 explore the contemporaneous association between 
abnormal R&D expenditure and the proximity of premanaged earnings to target in period t. 
Target earnings in models 3-5 (6-8) are defined as EARNt > 0 (∆EARNt > 0). Focusing first 
on results for models 3-5, the indicator variables WITHINt and BELOWt are both positive and 
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significant at the 1% level, with the exception of BELOWt in model 5 that is significant at the 
5% level. This confirms our univariate result that firms prune R&D expenditure when 
contemporaneous premanaged earnings are negative. The effect appears stronger for the 
WITHIN partition, consistent with management’s ability to fully overturn the earnings 
shortfall by cutting R&D spending. In model 4 we interact WITHINt and BELOWt with R&D 
intensity (RDIt). Estimated coefficients on both interaction terms are negative and significant, 
signifying that the propensity to cut R&D in the face of short-term earnings pressure is lower 
for firms where R&D activity represents a potentially important source of future value. 
Finally, in model 5 we test whether contemporaneous and lagged earnings pressures are 
associated with incrementally significant effects on R&D spending or whether they merely 
capture the same underlying phenomenon (e.g., poor performance). Both contemporaneous 
and lagged variables are significant, suggesting they are capturing distinct effects. Similar 
results to those reported in models 3-5 are evident in models 6-8 when the earnings target is 
defined as ∆EARNt > 0. The one notable exception is the interaction between BELOWt and 
RDIt in model 7, which fails to attain significance at conventional levels.  
 
Further analysis 
While findings in table 4 are consistent with real earnings management in response to 
short-term earnings targets, we cannot rule out the possibility that these results are simply 
capturing rationale changes in R&D spending in response to underlying performance 
problems. In particular, if missing an earnings target in the previous period, or facing the risk 
of reporting below-target earnings in the current period, are indicative of a more general 
decline in productive R&D opportunities, then one would expect efficient managers to prune 
R&D spending so as to avoid destroying shareholder value through overinvestment. Equation 
(1) controls for changes in expected R&D spending driven by fundamental factors; however, 
we acknowledge that this approach may be less than perfect and that consequently our 
findings could be driven by a correlated omitted variable problem. We therefore performed 
two supplementary tests designed to shed further light on this issue. 
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Our first test compares the relative magnitude of coefficient estimates for BELOW 
and WITHIN in table 4. Since the incentives to cut R&D spending to achieve target earnings 
are expected to be stronger for firms in WITHIN, the earnings management hypothesis 
predicts a stronger association between unexpected R&D cuts and WITHIN. In contrast, the 
poor performance hypothesis predicts a stronger association between R&D cuts and BELOW 
because firms in BELOW are more likely characterised by pervasive performance problems 
where cutbacks in discretionary investment expenditures are unavoidable. Visual inspection 
of the coefficient estimates in table 4 reveals that those on WITHIN are always larger than the 
corresponding estimates on BELOW. This is inconsistent with the poor performance 
hypothesis. Indeed, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of coefficient equality at the 0.06 
(0.04 and 0.08) level in model 4 (6 and 8) in favour of the alternative WITHIN > BELOW.vii 
The absence of larger coefficient estimates on BELOW coupled with evidence of significantly 
larger estimates on WITHIN in three of the six models in table 4 supports the view that 
earnings management to meet short-term targets is at least partially driving the association 
between the probability of a cut in R&D spending and WITHIN. 
Our second supplementary test seeks to better distinguish between temporary 
earnings shortfalls relative to target and more pervasive performance problems. All else 
equal, R&D cuts made by firms with temporary earnings shortfalls are less likely to be driven 
by fundamentals such as tighter funding constraints or a decline in their R&D opportunity set. 
Accordingly, evidence of the predicted association between R&D cuts and WITHIN for these 
cases is more likely to reflect target-driven earnings management than underlying 
performance difficulties. Firms facing temporary earnings shortfalls are defined as those 
where contemporaneous (lagged) premanaged (reported) earnings are below (above) target. In 
contrast, firms where both lagged reported earnings and contemporaneous premanaged 
earnings undershoot the target are viewed as having more persistent performance problems. 
We therefore split the sample according to lagged earnings relative to target and then examine 
the association between cuts in R&D spending and WITHIN separately for each subsample. 
Results are reported in table 5. Coefficient estimates on WITHIN are slightly larger for the 
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persistent poor performance subsamples (EARNt-1 ≤ 0 and ∆EARNt-1 ≤ 0) compared with the 
temporary poor performance subsamples (EARNt-1 > 0 and ∆EARNt-1 > 0). This is consistent 
with the view that poor underlying performance (rather than target-driven earnings 
management) may account for part of the observed link between R&D cuts and WITHIN. 
Nevertheless, coefficient estimates in the temporary poor performance subsamples remain 
positive, large in magnitude, and highly significant. To the extent that these observations face 
fewer fundamental performance problems associated with a loss of R&D opportunities, 
findings in table 5 suggest that previous results and conclusions are not being driven by 
expected changes in R&D spending link to underlying performance problems. Instead, these 
findings confirm the role of earnings management incentives as an economically important 
determinant of R&D spending decisions. 
In sum, findings reported in this section provide evidence of a statistically and 
economically significant link between unexpected cuts in R&D spending and reporting 
pressures associated with short-term earnings targets. Consistent with US findings, UK 
managers appear to prune R&D spending when there is a risk that contemporaneous earnings 
will undershoot target performance. Low R&D intensity firms have a higher propensity to cut 
R&D spending in response to contemporaneous earnings performance, perhaps because they 
face greater short-term earnings pressure. In contrast to previous studies, we also examine the 
sensitivity of R&D spending to prior-period earnings performance. Findings reveal that 
missing an earnings benchmark increases the probability that R&D spending will be cut the 
following year. Both high and low R&D intensity firms are equally sensitive to lagged 
earnings pressures.  
 
5. MARKET-BASED ANALYSIS 
Trading-off the rewards and penalties to benchmark beating 
In this section we explore the capital market implications of shaving R&D investment 
to boost earnings performance. Prior research suggests that share markets reward firms that 
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meet earnings targets with price increases while penalising firms that unexpectedly cut R&D 
spending with price decreases. We combine these two distinct literatures and test whether 
investors discount earnings growth achieved at the expense of an unexpected cut in R&D 
investment.viii We permit the valuation multiple on earnings growth to vary with unexpected 
R&D spending decisions using the following regression model (Barth et al. 1999, Skinner and 
Sloan 2002, Kasznik and McNichols 2002):  
itititititit RDEARNRDEARNR νλγγγ +<∆×>∆+<∆+>∆+= 0000 1210 , (2) 
where Rit is the 12-month share return for firm i ending three months after the balance sheet 
date in period t; ∆EARNit>0 is an indicator variable taking the value of one for positive 
earnings changes for firm i in period t and zero otherwise; ∆RDit<0 is an indicator variable 
taking the value of one for cuts in R&D spending during period t and zero otherwise; and νit 
is the regression residual. The estimated coefficient on ∆EARNit>0 captures the association 
between growth in reported earnings and the change in firm value, and is predicted to be 
positive. The estimated coefficient on ∆RDit<0 captures the link between unexpected cuts in 
R&D investment and changes in firm value, and is predicted to be negative. The interaction 
term ∆EARNit>0 × ∆RDit<0 permits the estimated coefficient on earnings growth to differ as 
a function of contemporaneous R&D spending. We interpret λ1 < 0 as evidence that the 
pricing rewards to benchmark beating are (at least partially) offset by the market penalties to 
unexpected cuts in R&D investment.ix 
Results are reported in table 6. Sample size is reduced to 3,309 observations as a 
result of missing returns data and exclusion of extreme return observations. The multiple on 
earnings growth is positive and significant for the full sample in panel A model 1: growth 
firms are associated with 28% higher returns on average compared with firms reporting an 
earnings decline. In contrast, the multiple on R&D cuts is negative in model 1: firms that 
prune R&D spending experience 10% lower returns on average compared with firms that 
maintain or increase their R&D spending. These findings are consistent with prior evidence 
from the benchmark beating and R&D valuation literatures, respectively. Model 2 extends the 
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basic regression to include the earnings-R&D interaction effect. The estimated coefficient on 
the interaction term is negative and significant, signifying lower market rewards when 
earnings growth is accompanied by a reduction in R&D expenditure. The net effect (0.32 – 
0.09) remains positive and significant, however, suggesting that the average market penalty to 
cutting R&D is outweighed by the reward to benchmark beating.  
Findings reported previously in section 4 indicate that the probability of shaving 
R&D to boost earnings is a decreasing function of R&D intensity. One explanation for this 
result is that the net benefit of managing R&D expenditure to beat an earnings benchmark 
declines with the importance of R&D as a source of future value creation. We examine this 
conjecture by testing whether the interaction between earnings increases and R&D cutbacks 
varies according to the importance of R&D as a driver of future value. Using R&D intensity 
to proxy for the significance of R&D investment for future performance, we divide the 
sample into low, moderate and high intensity portfolios by sorting firms annually according to 
the lagged ratio of R&D expenditure to sales, and then re-estimate equation (2) separately for 
each portfolio. The results are presented in panel B of table 6. The magnitude and significance 
of the earnings-R&D interaction coefficient increases monotonically with R&D intensity. 
Cuts in R&D spending appear to be viewed more negatively where current R&D activity 
represents an important driver of future value: the earnings multiple for low intensity firms 
with unexpected R&D cuts is 0.23 (0.24 – 0.01), compared with 0.18 (0.37 – 0.19) for high 
intensity firms. These findings, which are consistent with our logistic results reported in table 
4, support the view that the net benefit of manipulating R&D investment levels to deliver 
earnings growth is lower for firms whose future earnings performance is heavily reliant on 
current R&D spending. Note also that in the absence of a cut in R&D spending, the 
magnitude of the earnings multiple is increasing in R&D intensity, perhaps reflecting the fact 
that R&D intensive firms are more likely to be classified as growth stocks for which an 
increasing pattern of earnings might be considered particularly important (Barth et al. 1999). 
 
Does the market see through R&D manipulation? 
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 Not all R&D cuts are undertaken with the aim of boosting reported earnings 
performance. Pruning R&D spending may represent the most appropriate course of action as 
technological feasibility improves, a firm matures, or the stream of positive NPV projects 
dries up. All else equal, we expect the penalty associated with a reduction in R&D spending 
to be more pronounced when the market suspects the cut to have been motivated more by 
benchmark beating considerations than by real economic factors. Therefore, as a final test we 
examine the extent to which the market discriminates between target-driven reasons for 
cutting R&D expenditure and other reasons. To address this question, we extend regression 














where WITHINit is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where premanaged 
earnings undershoot last year’s earnings by an amount that could be reversed by pruning 
R&D expenditure and zero otherwise; ωit is the regression residual; and all other variables are 
as previously defined.x As in regression (2), ∆EARNit>0 × ∆RDit<0 permits the estimated 
coefficient on earnings growth to differ for R&D cutters. The main focus of our test is the 
three-way interaction term, which captures the incremental effect of R&D spending cuts that 
are most likely to have been driven by target-beating considerations. We interpret λ3 < 0 as 
evidence that the market penalises manipulation-driven cuts in R&D spending more heavily 
than reductions motivated by other reasons. Results are reported in table 7. 
Focusing initially on findings reported in column two for the full sample, the 
estimated coefficient on the three-way interaction term is negative and marginally significant 
(probability value = 0.1 for a two-tailed test). This is evidence that investors discount earnings 
increases in conjunction with R&D cuts more heavily when the reduction in R&D spending is 
likely to have been motivated by benchmark beating considerations. Nevertheless, the 
earnings multiple for suspected R&D manipulators remains positive (0.32 – 0.09 – 0.09), 
suggesting that on average the reward to reporting an earnings increase still outweighs the 
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penalty associated with cutting R&D even when the market strongly suspects that investment 
spending is being shaved to deliver earnings growth. However, we caution against placing 
undue weight on these findings given the low levels of statistical significance. 
The final three columns of table 7 report results partitioned according to R&D 
intensity. Evidence that the market discriminates between target-driven reasons for 
unexpected R&D cuts and other possible reasons is confined to moderate R&D intensity 
firms. For such firms, the market penalty for R&D cuts in the presence of earnings growth is 
statistically insignificant for cuts that appear to be driven by non-benchmark beating 
considerations (coefficient estimate equals -0.06; two-tailed probability value equals 0.15). 
By contrast, earnings increases that appear to be the result of R&D management are heavily 
penalised by the market, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient estimate on 
the three-way interaction term. Indeed, the market reward to earnings growth is entirely wiped 
out for firms suspected of pruning R&D to boost earnings performance (0.31 – 0.06 – 0.26).  
For low R&D intensity firms, unexpected R&D spending cuts in the presence of 
earnings growth go unpunished regardless of whether or not target-driven manipulation is a 
factor. This is consistent with investors perceiving a weak link between R&D investment and 
long-term value creation for such firms. The three-way interaction term in the high R&D 
intensity portfolio is insignificant (two-tailed probability value equal to 0.34), indicating that 
the market does not discriminate between target-driven reasons for R&D cuts and other 
reasons. Instead, investors penalise all reductions in R&D spending with equal severity in the 
presence of earnings growth, as evidenced by the negative and significant coefficient estimate 
on the ∆EARN>0 × ∆R&D<0 interaction term. Note also that the earnings multiple for high 
R&D intensity firms reporting earnings growth in the presence of R&D cuts (0.38 – 0.21 = 
0.17), although statistically significant at the five percent level, is noticeably lower than firms 
with low (0.23 – 0.00 = 0.23) and moderate (0.31 – 0.06 = 0.25) levels of R&D intensity. This 
result provides further evidence of how investors appear to discount the relevance of earnings 
growth for high R&D firms when combined with a reduction in R&D spending.xi Overall, 
these results suggest that investors interpret cuts in R&D spending in a relatively 
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sophisticated manner by conditioning their response on both the perceived reason for the cut 
and the importance of R&D investment as a driver of firm value. 
 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Policymakers repeatedly express concern that market pressure for short-term earnings 
growth may contribute to the low levels of R&D investment undertaken by UK firms relative 
to their international counterparts. This paper speaks to this ongoing debate by testing if UK 
firms cut R&D spending in response to short-term earnings pressures and how capital market 
participants interpret such behaviour. While prior US research documents evidence of 
apparently myopic investment behaviour with management shaving R&D expenditure to 
boost current-period earnings performance, little comparable large sample empirical evidence 
exists for the UK. Further, while separate literatures document the market-based rewards to 
beating earnings benchmarks and penalties to cutting R&D expenditure, extant research has 
not sought to evaluate the net product of these two competing effects.  
Empirical tests are based on a large sample of R&D-active UK firms during the 
period 1989 through 2002. Tests focus exclusively on firms that expense all R&D as incurred, 
with a Heckman selection model used to control for possible selection bias resulting from the 
exclusion of firms that capitalise all or part of their development expenditure. We find that 
R&D expenditure is sensitive to both current and lagged earnings performance relative to 
target (where target is defined as either earnings > 0 or earnings growth > 0). Specifically, 
failure to beat an earnings benchmark increases the probability of R&D being cut in the next 
accounting period, while pressure to achieve current-period earnings targets leads to 
contemporaneous cuts in R&D investment. These contemporaneous and lagged effects are 
incrementally significant suggesting that they are not merely capturing the same underlying 
phenomenon of poor performance. Although we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that 
our results are capturing a rationale response to poor performance, we believe that on balance 
these findings are consistent with UK managers pruning R&D spending in response to target-
driven earnings pressures. We also find that the strength of the contemporaneous association 
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between R&D spending and benchmark beating weakens as R&D intensity increases, 
consistent with management being less inclined to sacrifice long-term value creation for 
short-term earnings gains in firms where R&D investment represents a particularly important 
source of future earnings.  
Having established a link between R&D spending and earnings targets, we proceed 
by exploring how market participants interpret positive earnings growth in the presence of 
unexpected cuts in R&D spending. Results indicate that investors appear to discount earnings 
increases associated with unexpected cuts in R&D spending. The average response coefficient 
for earnings increases is lower for firms that cut R&D compared with those that maintain or 
increase R&D expenditure. Further analysis reveals that the market’s response to unexpected 
cuts in R&D spending is contingent on (i) the importance of R&D investment as a driver of 
firm value and (ii) the perceived reason for the cut. For low R&D-intensive firms, unexpected 
R&D spending cuts in the presence of earnings growth go unpunished regardless of whether 
or not target-driven manipulation is a factor. Conversely, investors penalise all cuts in R&D 
spending made by high R&D-intensive firms with equal severity in the presence of earnings 
growth. For firms with moderate levels of R&D activity, investors discriminate between 
manipulation-driven cuts in R&D spending and unexpected reductions motivated by other 
(non-earnings management) reasons, with the valuation penalty imposed on the former group 






 According to the UK R&D scoreboard (Department of Trade and Industry 2003), average R&D 
intensity (i.e., R&D investment as a percentage of sales) for the US, Japan, and the European Union 
(EU) is 5.2%, 4.3% and 3.7%, respectively. This compares with an R&D intensity of 2.5% for the UK. 
Government perceptions about underinvestment in R&D have recently led to the implementation of a 
series of measures designed to stimulate R&D activity. 
ii
 Under SSAP 13 (Revised), UK firms were required to disclose the amount of R&D capitalised during 
the period in a footnote. 
iii
 Based on a sample of Australian firms, Chan, Faffe, Gharghori and Ho (2007) document higher 
positive risk-adjusted future stock returns for R&D expensers relative to capitalisers. Chan et al. (2007) 
interpret their findings as evidence that immediate write-off of R&D leads to contemporaneous 
underpricing (and therefore higher future abnormal returns when these pricing errors subsequently 
unwind). It is unclear whether such mispricing exists in the UK; and even if expensers are mispriced, 
we do not expect this phenomenon to impact the validity of our empirical tests and associated 
conclusions for several reasons. First, our earnings management tests do not utilise market data. 
Second, where returns are used in section 5, they form the dependent variable in our regression models. 
Accordingly, any measurement error caused by mispricing will be captured by the regression residual; 
coefficient estimates will remain unbiased. 
iv
 Recent evidence suggests analysts’ consensus forecasts are emerging as the salient target for US 
management (Dechow, Richardson and Tuna 2003, Brown and Caylor 2005). We therefore repeated 
our tests using earnings benchmarked against the IBES consensus analyst forecast. Results and 
conclusions are similar to those reported in the body of the paper. We choose not to emphasise these 
findings, however, due to research design and data problems. First, prior research suggests that 
forecasts formed late in the reporting cycle represent the key targets against which reported earnings 
performance is assessed (Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Burgstahler and Eames 2006). This creates a 
serious timing problem in the context of our study, however, because most of the annual R&D spend is 
likely to have occurred before these final forecasts are set. Second, analysts’ forecasts are 
endogenously determined, with managers using both expectations management and earnings 
management to ensure reported earnings meet of exceed the forecast (Bartov et al. 2002). Our tests 
using analysts’ forecasts do not control for forecast endogeneity because the issue of expectations 
management lies beyond the scope of our research. Third, requiring that firms have forecast data on 
IBES reduces sample size by almost 60%.  
v
 Throughout this paper, earnings are defined as earnings before extraordinary and non-operating 
exceptional items. Accordingly, earnings are equal to Datastream item 625 pre-FRS 3 and Datastream 
items 625+1083–1094–1097 post-FRS 3. 
vi
 The vector of explanatory variables in the first stage probit regression modelling the decision to 




Earnings variability is the variance of earnings per share (183) computed using at least three annual 
observations; positive earnings is an indicator variable equal to one if earnings (625) are positive and 
zero otherwise; profitability is defined as earnings (625) scaled by lagged total assets; size is defined as 
the natural logarithm of the year-end market value of equity (MV); the market-to-book ratio is 
calculated as the market value of equity divided by the book value of shareholders’ funds (305); R&D 
intensity is defined as the R&D expense (119) scaled by lagged total assets for expensers and the R&D 
expense plus the increase in the R&D asset (342) scaled by lagged total assets for capitalisers; and risk 
is calculated as the market model beta (Beta).  
vii
 A similar pattern is apparent for marginal effects and odds ratios. Marginal effects in models 3-8 for 
WITHIN range from 35% (model 3) to 86% (model 5) larger than the corresponding value for BELOW, 
while odds ratios for WITHIN range from 18% (model 7) to 60% (model 2) larger than the 
corresponding value for BELOW.  
viii
 Tests focus on earnings changes rather than earnings levels due to problems with sparse data, 
particularly when regression models are estimated separately for subsets of observations partitioned on 
R&D intensity. For example, the three-way interaction variable in model (3) is equal to one in only 15 
(eight and nine) cases in the low (medium and high) R&D intensity portfolios, raising serious doubts 
about the reliability of coefficient estimates derived from such data.      
ix
 Similar conclusions to those based on equation (2) are obtained using a price levels specification 
(Barth et al. 1999). We present results based on the changes specification in the main body of the paper 
because we are more confident that these results are not attributable to firm-specific factors omitted 
from a levels model. In additional analyses we extended equation (2) by adding other potential 
determinants of stock returns including R&D intensity, firm size, and the market-to-book ratio. Results 
and conclusions are robust to these alternative specifications. 
x
 In untabulated tests we estimated an expanded version of equation (3) that also included BELOW and 
its associated interaction terms. Probability values for the three-way interaction ∆EARN>0 × ∆RD<0 × 
BELOW are large (> 0.5) in all estimations, while findings for WITHIN and its associated interactions 
do not change. 
xi
 This effect appears to be particularly acute for high R&D firms suspected of using their R&D 
discretion to deliver reported earnings growth: the earnings growth multiple for these firms (0.38 – 0.21 
– 0.1 = 0.07) is statistically indistinguishable from zero (two-tailed probability value equal to 0.67). 
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Table 1 
Sample selection procedure used to identify U.K.-resident R&D active firms with fiscal year-
ends between December 1989 and December 2002. 
   Firms Firm-years 
UK non-financial firms with at least three consecutive years of non-zero R&D 
expenditure between December 1989 and December 2002 (inclusive)   867   5,009  
Less:         
 Missing data for lagged variables    (48)   (377)  
 Changes in financial year-end    (33)   (169)  
 Insufficient industry data    (8)   (52)  
 Missing data to compute explanatory variables    (42)   (291)  
 Outliers removed    (36)   (254)  
Final sample (expensers and capitalisers)    700   3,866  
 Firm-years partitioned by accounting treatment of R&D:          
 Capitalisers 456        
 Expensers 3,410        
 3,866        
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics for R&D active U.K.-resident firms listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. The sample is composed of firms that expense all R&D as incurred and comprises 
3,410 firm-year observations. 
Variablea Mean Std dev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
CUT 0.358 0.479 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
MKTB 4.474 8.095 0.263 1.069 1.677 2.905 26.474 
SIZE 11.708 2.125 7.454 10.153 11.609 13.178 16.349 
LEV 0.532 3.915 0.065 0.346 0.464 0.565 1.065 
RDI 0.470 0.499 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
|ACC| 0.076 0.123 0.001 0.026 0.052 0.092 0.441 
∆RDt-1 0.465 2.247 -6.924 -0.056 0.083 0.336 8.818 
∆SALES 0.091 0.500 -1.018 -0.033 0.057 0.165 1.837 
∆CAPX 0.087 0.361 -0.832 0.011 0.071 0.158 1.073 
∆FUNDS 0.019 0.275 -0.464 -0.026 0.015 0.054 0.612 
∆INDRD 0.083 3.335 -5.750 -0.056 -0.004 0.029 10.583 
a Variable definitions are as follows (Datastream item codes in parentheses): CUT is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the change in R&D expenditure (119) is negative and zero otherwise; MKTB is the unlevered market-to-
book ratio (MV+306+321/391); SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (MV); LEV is leverage 
(389+321/392); RDI is an indicator variable equal to one if R&D intensity exceeds the median value for the 
industry and zero otherwise (where R&D intensity is defined as R&D expenditure dividend by total sales (104)); 
|ACC| is current period abnormal accruals (376-375-389+381-402-562) scaled by lagged total assets (392), 
computed using the modified-Jones model; ∆RDt-1 is the lagged change in the natural logarithm of R&D 
expenditure; ∆SALES is change in the natural logarithm of total sales; ∆CAPX is the change in the natural 
logarithm of capital expenditure (330); ∆FUNDS is the change in the natural logarithm of earnings before 
depreciation and R&D expenditure (625+119+402+562); ∆INDRD is the industry median change in the natural 





Univariate tests of the association between contemporaneous and lagged earnings 
performance (relative to target) and changes in R&D expenditure. The sample comprises 
3,410 firm-year observations for U.K.-resident, R&D active firms between December 1989 
and December 2002. 
Panel A: Lagged earnings performance    
 
Lagged earnings relative to 
target:a  Chi-square statistic 
 ACHIEVED  MISSED  (probability value) 
Target: EARNt-1 > 0     
 ∆R&Dt ≥ 0 1768 421   
 (0.67) (0.54)   
 ∆R&Dt < 0 869 352  41.18 
 (0.33) (0.46)  (<0.01) 
Target: ∆EARNt-1 > 0     
 ∆R&Dt ≥ 0 1375 814   
 (0.68) (0.58)   
 ∆R&Dt < 0 636 585  37.27 
 (0.32) (0.42)  (<0.01) 
Panel B: Contemporaneous earnings performance 
 
Contemporaneous premanaged 
earnings relative to target:b  Chi-square statistic 
 BELOW WITHIN ABOVE  (probability value) 
Target: EARNt > 0      
 ∆R&Dt ≥ 0 336 117 1736   
 (0.52) (0.58) (0.68)   
 ∆R&Dt < 0 307 84 830  56.37 
 (0.48) (0.42) (0.32)  (<0.01) 
Target: ∆EARNt > 0      
 ∆R&Dt ≥ 0 516 264 1409   
 (0.56) (0.59) (0.69)   
 ∆R&Dt < 0 409 182 630  54.69 
 (0.44) (0.41) (0.31)  (<0.01) 
a
 One-year lagged earnings relative to target, where the target is defined as either positive earnings (EARN > 0) or 
positive earnings growth (∆EARN > 0). The column headed ACHIEVED contains firm-years where lagged 
earnings exceeded target. The column headed MISSED contains firm-years where lagged earnings fell short of 
target. Earnings are defined as reported earnings before extraordinary and non-operating exceptional items. For 
fiscal years preceding (following) 23 June 1993 earnings are equal to Datastream item 625 (625+1083–1094–
1097). 
b
 Contemporaneous premanaged earnings are defined as earnings before extraordinary and non-operating 
exceptional items plus R&D expenditure. Target earnings are defined as either positive earnings (EARN > 0) or 
positive earnings growth (∆EARN > 0). The sample is partitioned according to the level of premanaged earnings 
relative to target. The column headed ABOVE contains firm-years where premanaged earnings exceed target. The 
column headed WITHIN contains firm-years where premanaged earnings undershoot target by an amount that 
could be reversed by pruning R&D expenditure. The column headed BELOW contains firm-years where 
premanaged earnings are so low that the target remains beyond reach even if R&D spending were reduced to zero. 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics and coefficient estimates for logistic regressions relating the probability of 
a reduction in R&D spending to measures of contemporaneous and lagged earnings 
performance (measured relative to target) and a vector of control variables. The sample 
comprises 3,410 firm-year observations for U.K.-resident, R&D active firms between 
December 1989 and December 2002. Two-tailed probability values are reported in 
parentheses. 
 Lagged earnings  Contemporaneous earnings target 
 
target  Target: EARNt > 0  Target: ∆EARNt > 0 
Variablea Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Intercept 0.658 0.716  0.487 0.065 0.309  1.159 1.081 0.265 
 (0.07) (0.05)  (0.19) (0.87) (0.41)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.48) 
∆RDt-1 0.051 0.050  0.047 0.048 0.049  0.044 0.043 0.048 
 (0.02) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆SALESt -0.222 -0.225  -0.219 -0.213 -0.221  -0.178 -0.195 -0.171 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
∆CAPXt -0.917 -0.923  -0.972 -0.972 -0.923  -1.024 -1.033 -0.935 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆FUNDSt -0.559 -0.545  -0.093 -0.081 -0.382  -0.020 -0.149 -0.170 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.61) (0.66) (0.07)  (0.91) (0.47) (0.38) 
∆INDRDt 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.96) (0.91)  (0.96) (0.95) (0.94)  (0.99) (0.99) (0.96) 
|ACCt| -0.011 -0.041  0.057 0.152 -0.112  0.497 0.688 0.006 
 (0.97) (0.93)  (0.90) (0.73) (0.81)  (0.20) (0.08) (0.98) 
SIZEt -0.046 -0.047  -0.053 -0.058 -0.042  -0.070 -0.077 -0.044 
 (0.02) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
LEVt 0.299 0.318  0.270 0.210 0.322  0.254 0.275 0.328 
 (0.15) (0.12)  (0.18) (0.30) (0.11)  (0.21) (0.18) (0.10) 
MKTBt 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.38) (0.37)  (0.42) (0.44) (0.41)  (0.38) (0.37) (0.37) 
RDIt -0.899 -0.986  -0.915 -0.875 -0.943  -0.834 -0.772 -0.923 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
BIASt -0.339 -0.357  -0.159 0.110 -0.188  -0.462 -0.398 -0.246 
 (0.06) (0.05)  (0.37) (0.59) (0.29)  (0.01) (0.04) (0.17) 
EARNt-1 ≤ 0 0.609 0.541    0.442    0.642 
 (0.01) (0.01)    (0.01)    (0.01) 
∆EARNt-1 ≤ 0 0.198 0.139    0.180    0.185 
 (0.01) (0.08)    (0.02)    (0.02) 
RDI*EARNt-1 ≤ 0  0.102         
  (0.62)  
   
 
   
RDI*∆EARNt-1 ≤ 0  0.153         
  (0.35)  
   
 
   
WITHINt    0.816 1.223 0.574  0.581 0.568 0.602 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
BELOWt    0.605 0.755 0.311  0.318 0.399 0.369 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
RDIt*WITHINt     -2.641    -3.302  
     (0.02)    (0.02)  
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RDIt*BELOWt     -1.042    -0.179  
     (0.09)    (0.80)  
Likelihood ratio 328.10 329.73  316.34 325.56 341.37  301.75 309.47 360.07 
χ2 statistic p-value 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 
Pseudo R2 0.126 0.127  0.122 0.125 0.131  0.116 0.119 0.138 
a The dependent variable is log (pi / [1 – pi]), where pi is the probability of a cut in R&D spending. Explanatory 
variables are defined as follows (Datastream item codes in parentheses): ∆RDt-1 is the lagged change in the natural 
logarithm of R&D expenditure; ∆SALES is change in the natural logarithm of total sales; ∆CAPX is the change in 
the natural logarithm of capital expenditure (330); ∆FUNDS is the change in the natural logarithm of earnings 
before depreciation and R&D expenditure (625+119+402+562); ∆INDRD is the industry median change in the 
natural logarithm of R&D (computed after excluding the sample firm). |ACCt| is the absolute value of operating 
accruals (376-375-389+381-402-562) scaled by lagged total assets (392), computed using the modified-Jones 
model; SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (MV); LEV is leverage (389+321/392); MKTB is the 
unlevered market-to-book ratio (MV+306+321/391); RDI is an indicator variable equal to one if R&D intensity 
exceeds the median value for the industry and zero otherwise (where R&D intensity is defined as R&D 
expenditure divided by total sales (104)); BIAS is the inverse Mills ratio retrieved from a first-stage probit 
regression modelling the decision to expense or capitalise R&D investment (See footnote five for details); EARNt-1 
≤ 0 is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years where lagged earnings are negative and zero otherwise; 
∆EARNt-1 ≤ 0 is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years where the lagged earnings change is negative and 
zero otherwise; WITHIN is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years where premanaged earnings 
undershoot target by an amount that could be reversed by pruning R&D expenditure and zero otherwise; BELOW 
is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years where premanaged earnings are so low that the target remains 







Summary statistics and coefficient estimates for logistic regressions relating the probability of 
a reduction in R&D spending to measures of contemporaneous earnings performance 
(measured relative to target) and a vector of control variables controlling for past 
performance. The sample comprises 3,410 firm-year observations for U.K.-resident, R&D 
active firms between December 1989 and December 2002. Two-tailed probability values are 
reported in parentheses. 
 Earnings relative to target 
 Target: EARNt > 0  Target: ∆EARNt > 0 
Variablea EARNt-1 ≤ 0 EARNt-1 > 0  ∆EARNt-1 ≤  0 ∆EARNt-1 > 0 
Intercept 2.306 -0.238  3.102 -0.403 
 (0.01) (0.57)  (0.01) (0.35) 
∆RDt-1 0.083 0.041  0.085 0.037 
 (0.01) (0.03)  (0.01) (0.06) 
∆SALESt -0.032 -1.501  -0.017 -1.304 
 (0.74) (0.01)  (0.86) (0.01) 
∆CAPXt -0.685 -0.766  -0.690 -0.791 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
∆FUNDSt -0.055 -1.473  -0.355 -0.980 
 (0.76) (0.01)  (0.14) (0.03) 
∆INDRDt 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
 (0.27) (0.61)  (0.20) (0.55) 
|ACCt| -0.095 -0.165  0.215 0.170 
 (0.86) (0.82)  (0.70) (0.81) 
SIZEt -0.112 -0.014  -0.122 -0.015 
 (0.01) (0.53)  (0.01) (0.48) 
LEVt 0.746 0.064  0.695 0.054 
 (0.02) (0.82)  (0.01) (0.84) 
MKTBt 0.001 -0.001  0.001 -0.001 
 (0.53) (0.83)  (0.54) (0.77) 
RDIt -0.843 -0.924  -0.801 -0.925 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (0.01) (0.01) 
BIASt -0.714 0.067  -0.984 0.051 
 (0.04) (0.75)  (0.01) (0.81) 
WITHINt 0.565 0.401  0.796 0.665 
 (0.01) (0.05)  (0.01) (0.01) 
BELOWt 0.092 0.213  -0.238 0.420 
 (0.32) (0.10)  (0.17) (0.01) 
      
Likelihood ratio 106.07 251.99  116.10 276.38 
χ2 statistic p-value 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
Pseudo R2 0.172 0.127  0.187 0.139 
a The dependent variable is log (pi / [1 – pi]), where pi is the probability of a cut in R&D spending. Explanatory 
variables are defined as follows (Datastream item codes in parentheses): ∆RDt-1 is the lagged change in the natural 
logarithm of R&D expenditure; ∆SALES is change in the natural logarithm of total sales; ∆CAPX is the change in 
the natural logarithm of capital expenditure (330); ∆FUNDS is the change in the natural logarithm of earnings 
before depreciation and R&D expenditure (625+119+402+562); ∆INDRD is the industry median change in the 
natural logarithm of R&D (computed after excluding the sample firm). |ACCt| is the absolute value of operating 
accruals (376-375-389+381-402-562) scaled by lagged total assets (392), computed using the modified-Jones 
model; SIZE is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation (MV); LEV is leverage (389+321/392); MKTB is the 
unlevered market-to-book ratio (MV+306+321/391); RDI is an indicator variable equal to one if R&D intensity 
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exceeds the median value for the industry and zero otherwise (where R&D intensity is defined as R&D 
expenditure divided by total sales (104)); BIAS is the inverse Mills ratio retrieved from a first-stage probit 
regression modelling the decision to expense or capitalise R&D investment (See footnote five for details); EARNt-1 
≤ 0 is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years where lagged earnings are negative and zero otherwise; 
∆EARNt-1 ≤ 0 is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years where the lagged earnings change is negative and 
zero otherwise; WITHIN is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years where premanaged earnings 
undershoot target by an amount that could be reversed by pruning R&D expenditure and zero otherwise; BELOW 
is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years where premanaged earnings are so low that the target remains 








Summary statistics and coefficient estimates from OLS regressions of 12-month share returns 
on changes in earnings and R&D expenditure. The sample comprises 3,309 firm-year 
observations for U.K.-resident, R&D active firms between December 1989 and December 
2002 with returns data available from Datastream. Two-tailed probability values based on 
robust Huber-White t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
Intercept ∆EARNt>0 ∆RDt<0 
∆EARNt>0 × 
∆RDt<0 N F Adj-R2 
Panel A: Full samplea        
 Model 1 -0.05 0.28 -0.10  3309 123.02 0.07 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)     
 Model 2 -0.07 0.32 -0.04 -0.09 3309 85.08 0.08 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01)    
Panel B: By R&D intensityb       
 Low intensity -0.08 0.24 -0.03 -0.01 1098 30.09 0.07 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.28) (0.44)    
 Medium intensity -0.10 0.31 -0.05 -0.06 1109 43.86 0.10 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.13) (0.17)    
 High intensity -0.04 0.37 -0.06 -0.19 1102 22.91 0.06 
 (0.25) (0.01) (0.22) (0.02)    
a
 Variable definitions are as follows. The dependent variable is 12-month share return ending three months after 
the balance sheet data; ∆EARN > 0 is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in earnings (before 
extraordinary and non-operating exceptional items) is positive and zero otherwise; ∆RD  < 0 is an indicator 
variable equal to one if the change in R&D expenditure is negative and zero otherwise. 
b
 For each sample year observations are partitioned into low, moderate and high R&D intensity portfolios by 





Summary statistics and coefficient estimates from OLS regressions examining the intervening 
effect of earnings management incentives on the association between 12-month share returns 
and changes in earnings and R&D expenditure. The sample comprises 3,309 firm-year 
observations for U.K.-resident, R&D active firms between December 1989 and December 
2002 with returns data available from Datastream. Two-tailed probability values based on 
robust Huber-White t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 Full R&D intensity:b 
Variablea Sample Low Moderate High 
Intercept -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.16) 
∆EARNt>0 0.32 0.23 0.31 0.38 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
∆RDt<0 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.18) (0.45) (0.42) (0.54) 
∆EARNt>0 × ∆RDt<0 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.21 
 (0.01) (0.93) (0.15) (0.02) 
∆EARNt>0 × WΙΤΗΙΝt 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.05 
 (0.99) (0.27) (0.79) (0.65) 
∆EARNt>0 × ∆RDt<0 × WΙΤΗΙΝt -0.09 0.03 -0.26 -0.10 
 (0.10) (0.39) (0.05) (0.34) 
F 51.61 17.56 26.51 14.21 
Adjusted-R2 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.06 
N 3309 1098 1109 1102 
a
 WITHIN is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where premanaged earnings undershoot last year’s 
reported earnings by an amount that could be reversed by pruning R&D expenditure and zero otherwise. All 
remaining variables are defined in table 6. The dependent variable is 12-month share return ending three months 
after the balance sheet date; ∆EARN > 0 is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in earnings (before 
extraordinary and non-operating exceptional items) is positive and zero otherwise; ∆RD < 0 is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the change in R&D expenditure is negative and zero otherwise. 
b
 For each sample year observations are partitioned into low, moderate and high R&D intensity portfolios by 
sorting on the basis of the lagged ratio of R&D expenditure to sales. 
